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The Lacanians vs. Science
A spectre is haunting the current theoretical debate in psychoanalysis – the 
spectre of techno-science. It has become almost a cliché in Lacanian circles to 
portray the contemporary domain of science as a “foreclosure of the subject of 
desire.”1 What does it mean? Science, or better its contemporary neoliberal off-
spring, techno-science – as they like to say – at the peak of its social power and 
recognition, would be responsible for reducing human experience to a transpar-
ent and calculable object. 
The Lacanian psychoanalytic doxa seems to be concerned with the pretension of 
contemporary cognitivist-influenced psychology to posses the “objective data.” 
The latter’s “compulsive drive toward measurement” and its overuse of quanti-
tative statistical models in order to “control,” “categorize,” and “channel” the 
patient would represent a model of cure where the psychic sufferance is reduced 
to “a void of knowledge that has to be filled with information from the therapeu-
tic Other.”2 It is nevertheless surprising how in the majority of cases from a com-
prehensible ideological critique of the contemporary dominant medical appara-
tuses we are suddenly thrown into an utter rejection of scientific rationality. As 
stated by a prominent Italian psychoanalyst, Fabio Tognassi (sadly exemplary 
of a common conviction in the Lacanian community): 
The discourse of science – the discourse oriented toward absolute knowledge – 
aims at revealing the quote of rationality embedded in the Real; it aims at cover-
ing with the veil of the signifier – the veil of causality (causalità) – the realm of 
the unexpected (casualità). And in doing so it gets rid of what by definition is 
1 Massimo Recalcati. L’uomo senza inconscio. Figure della nuova clinica piscoanalitica. Raf-
faello Cortina Editore, Milan 2010.
2 Fabio Tognassi, “Soggetto e sapere: la misura dell’Altro,” in Psico-Pratika, no. 26, 2006.
Pietro Bianchi*
The Lack(anians) 
Use and misuse of a concept between psychoanalysis and science
Filozofski vestnik   |   Volume XXXIV  |   Number 2   |   2013   |   177–200
FV_02_2013.indd   177 15. 12. 13   18:39
178
pietro bianchi
destined to remain outside of the domain of the Other: Das Ding, i.e. what is im-
possible to be assimilated to knowledge.3 
The discourse of science would be responsible for a complete reduction of the 
Real to the domain of the signifier. Its normativity would constitute a typical ex-
ample of human ὕβρις: the rejection of the limits imposed by the Real on human 
experience. Moreover, science would erase the ethical status of the unconscious 
trying to reduce it to a fully constituted ontological (and because of that, sym-
bolically intelligible) object. 
Experience demonstrates this: a form of analysis that boasts of its highly scien-
tific distinctiveness gives rise to normative notions that I characterize by evoking 
the curse Saint Matthew utters on those who make the bundles heavier when they 
are to be carried by others. Strengthening the categories of affective normativity 
produces disturbing results.4
In more appropriate Lacanian terms, the fundamental accusation can be sum-
marized as follows: the image of nature addressed by the discourse of science is 
characterized by the rejection of sexuated subjects. The Lacanians accused sci-
entific formalization of reducing the sexuated dimension of parlêtre to silence. 
According to this view, the parlêtre would expose the impossibility of the realm 
of the signifier (the Other of scientific discourse) being able to write a formula of 
jouissance. In other words, there is a singular relationship to jouissance rejecting 
any pretension of universalization and structurally excluded from the realm of 
the Symbolic. 
Thus far we have been addressing the Lacanian doxa. But how incorrect is it to 
accuse the Lacanian field as a whole (that is, the field opened up by the teach-
ings of Jacques Lacan and not necessarily inherited by his offspring nor directly 
imputable to Lacan’s seminars) of subscribing to this naïve and unacceptable 
representation of scientific endeavour? If we say that scientific rationality oper-
ates a systematic erasure, or foreclosure, of the subject of desire, are we sub-
scribing to a fundamental Lacanian proposition or are we rather incorporating 
(perniciously incorporating, we are tempted to claim) an ideological rejection of 
3 Ibidem.
4 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959–
1960, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 1992, pp. 133-134.
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science that has nothing to do with the psychoanalytic field itself? Is it correct 
to say, as Miller seems to believe in Clarification, that the task of psychoanalysis 
is to bring back to the surface what science forecloses from its discourse? That 
psychoanalysis is, in a sense, the reversed side of science? Is psychoanalysis 
destined to play the part of the analysis of the formations of the unconscious 
of scientific discourse? Is not science – the ideological Lacanian would claim – 
perhaps full of slips of the tongue, symptoms, unsuccessful concealments of the 
singularity of the scientist? Is not its presumed imaginary universality full of 
traces of the subject of the unconscious who makes it possible while at the same 
time being rejected from its field (suture)?
Our thesis will rather go in the opposite direction: science does not represent 
the successful concealment of the subject of the unconscious, but rather the 
most blatant proof of its existence and productivity. If we define the expression 
“subject of the unconscious” deprived of all the inevitable (and hard to die) im-
aginary and ideological representations and we reduce it to the core of its ob-
jectivity, we will have nothing but a practice of de-imaginarization. We used the 
term “practice” because the subject of the unconscious is not a substantialized 
entity that we need to approximately approach with increasingly accurate clini-
cal knowledge, but rather a hypothesis that orientates a never-ending process of 
de-imaginarization and creation of non-imaginary thought. The term “objectiv-
ity” (rather than “productive illusion,” for example) should be understood in 
all its anti-empirical stance: it is “a conquest and a task, which means that its 
progress recalls a common root between the theoretical and the ethical.”5 If psy-
choanalysis and science has such a common root, it relies on a counter-intuitive 
and anti-imaginary form of thought that equals the subtractive action of separa-
tion from the imaginary with the creation of the New. 
The crude simplifications that characterize the contemporary Lacanian doxa 
are not simply a sign of misunderstanding or inaccuracy in the reception of the 
Lacanian text. They rather indicate, sometimes even in a symptomatic (that is, 
contradictory) form, a hesitation that characterized Lacan’s teaching from the 
very beginning until the end. As if the relationship between psychoanalysis and 
science had followed different paths that never reached a satisfactory synthesis. 
5 Jean Petitot, La filosofia matematica di Albert Lautman, in AA.VV. Enciclopedia Einaudi, 
vol. 15, pp. 1034-1041.
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When faced with such a crucial epistemological problem, we are left with at-
tempted yet unresolved paths which allow for many different Lacanian projects 
(both clinically and theoretically) that sometimes feature very few elements in 
common until they barely resemble each other. The unacceptable equation of 
science with the foreclosure of the subject of the unconscious coexists with the 
Cartesian subtractive definition of the subject itself; the statements about sci-
ence as a paranoiac pretension of reducing the Real to the signifier are followed 
by an endless endeavour in order to never separate psychoanalysis from the pro-
ject of formalization; the accusation addressed to science of it being ideological 
is accompanied by a procedure of transmission of psychoanalysis which is very 
reminiscent of the process of the axiomatization of formal knowledge. In the fol-
lowing paragraphs we will try to delineate some of these paths in order, primar-
ily, to elucidate how the missed encounter between science and psychoanalysis 
might have ever occurred. It is our conviction that a critique of the misappropri-
ations and simplifications of scientific rationality by the Lacanian community 
can be addressed and partially resolved via the internal conceptual resources of 
the Lacanian field itself. It is an indication – we hope – of another possible alli-
ance of Lacanian psychoanalysis and science which is as necessary today as it 
was almost fifty years ago when the attempt of the Cahiers pour l’analyse group 
went largely ignored by the followers of Jacques Lacan, remaining so through 
the following years and up until today. 
The Cartesian subject of the unconscious
If we consider only the interventions directly made by Lacan himself and not 
the contributions of many of his pupils, colleagues, and collaborators, the epis-
temological question in psychoanalysis has been addressed primarily (and al-
most exclusively) in the last text included in the Écrits, arguably one of the most 
important of the entire collection: Science and Truth. The article was specifically 
written as an overture for the first issue of the Cahiers pour l’analyse and was 
meant to give a significant orientation for the development of the journal. Lacan 
nevertheless decided to read the article at the first session of Seminar XIII, The 
Object of Psychoanalysis, on 1 December 1965, in what was to become probably 
the year when he dealt most profoundly with the relationship between psychoa-
nalysis and science. 
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In this crucially important article Lacan does not make a direct pronouncement 
concerning psychoanalysis’s vocation as a science. Contrary to what Freud 
struggled for during his whole life, at this point of his teaching Lacan does not 
put much faith in the possibility of formalizing psychoanalysis according to a 
scientific protocol. He rather underlines that “the subject upon which we op-
erate in psychoanalysis can only be the subject of science.”6 It is important to 
stress such a preliminary remark, without which there is only confusion in the 
relationship between science and psychoanalysis. Even though the debate re-
garding the Freudian project of a scientific expression of psychoanalysis does 
not seem to have ceased even nowadays – many psychoanalysts underline the 
necessity of psychoanalysis being formalized in a scientific manner – Lacan 
takes a different path. He rather states the crucial importance of the relation of 
psychoanalysis to the field constituted by modern science – not to science itself – 
and he claims that without that field any form of psychoanalysis would not be 
possible. It would be meaningless to ask under which conditions psychoanaly-
sis can be considered a science; what does matter for Lacan is how the field 
constituted autonomously by science creates the conditions of possibility for 
psychoanalysis.
This is why it was important to promote firstly, and as a fact to be distinguished 
from the question of knowing whether psychoanalysis is a science (that is, wheth-
er its field is scientific), the fact that its praxis implies no other subject than that 
of science.7
 As claimed by Jean-Claude Milner:
With regard to the analytic operation, science does not play the role of an ideal – 
possibly infinitely distant – point; strictly speaking, science is not exterior to psy-
choanalysis, it structures in an internal manner the very matter of the object of 
psychoanalysis.8
6 Jacques Lacan, Science and Truth, in Id., Écrits, W. W. Norton & Co., New York – London 
2006, p. 729.
7 Idem, p. 733.
8 Jean-Claude Milner, L’Œuvre claire: Lacan, la science, la philosophie, Seuil, Paris 1995, 
translation in English (by Oliver Feltham) of Chapter 2 in Jean-Claude Milner, “The Doc-
trine of Science,” in Umbr(a): Science and Truth, no. 1, 2000, p. 35.
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Instead of dealing directly with an epistemological question regarding psychoa-
nalysis itself, Lacan here establishes the common ground that coordinates what 
is nevertheless a separation between science and psychoanalysis. Lacan rather 
underlines that in the field inaugurated by modern science, identified here with 
the figures of Galileo and Descartes, it is possible to deduce a particular figure of 
the subject, which is the same subject upon which psychoanalysis as a practice 
operates. What is it?
Lacan identifies modern physics with a specific operation: the elimination of 
every contingent quality of existents in the description of the world. Therefore, 
a theory of the subject of science repeats the same gesture. The characters of 
the particular individual, be they psychic, somatic or intellectual, are stripped 
down. As Milner puts it, the subject of science “is neither mortal nor immortal, 
neither pure nor impure, neither just nor unjust, neither sinner nor saint, nei-
ther damned nor saved”9: it does not have consciousness, interiority, or reflexiv-
ity. Science carries out a cut in order to separate the subject from the individual. 
All the qualitative contingent determinations are erased in order to isolate a 
pure non-specific core. This is what the cogito makes possible: it is an operation 
of minimal subtraction from every positive attribute. Lacan, following Koyré, 
designates the historical moment when this act of coupure emerged for the first 
time in Descartes. Such is the scope of the Cartesian doubt: the suspension of 
the certainty of every identifiable particular in order to make the void place of 
enunciation emerge in all its clarity.  
But the eliminativist gesture is only the first movement of the cogito, the other – 
which is specifically Lacanian – is the identification of this subtracted void with 
thought. Lacan’s postulate claims that there is an unbridgeable distance be-
tween thought and knowledge. They belong to two completely different fields. 
Thought appears only when all the positive qualities of knowledge are stripped 
down. While the cogito is “the defile of a rejection of all knowledge.”10 Lacan’s 
original re-interpretation relies on its equation with a thought without qualities: 
a pure void act of subtraction. The gesture of thought is not the positive correlate 
of an imaginary consciousness, but the erasure of any positive determination 
until what remains is only the subtractive clarity of a generic place. It is in this 
9 Jean-Claude Milner, “The Doctrine of Science,” op. cit., p. 38. 
10 Jacques Lacan, Science and Truth, op. cit., p. 727.
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precise point that Lacan traces the continuity between the gesture inaugurated 
by modern science and the birth of psychoanalysis with Sigmund Freud. If the 
subtractive subject of science appears at the moment when the positivity of 
knowledge is cast into doubt, psychoanalysis represents the path par excellence 
in order to be faithful to this groundbreaking discovery. What do we have in 
the symptoms if not an act of castration of the positive certitude of conscious-
ness’s knowledge? If there is a thought in the dream, in the wiz, in the slip of the 
tongue, is it not it at the expense of every positivity of imaginary knowledge?
In order to develop the conviction of the subtractive dimension of the uncon-
scious, it is mandatory to accept a preliminary remark: as we assumed the sepa-
ration between knowledge and thought, we also have to accept the complete 
separation between knowledge and the unconscious. The unconscious does not 
have anything to do with positive knowledge. To put it in simple terms, the 
unconscious does not know anything.11 Against a widely diffused opinion, for 
example very popular in Jungian-influenced circles, the unconscious is not an 
archive of past experiences, nor an archaeological storage of traumas, nor an ac-
cumulation of hidden and repressed images and tropes (which when brought to 
the collective level necessarily become archetypes). This is the reason why Laca-
nian-oriented clinical psychoanalysis is never based on the interpretation of the 
unconscious. Lacan was utterly clear in claiming that psychoanalysis does not 
have anything to do with hermeneutic interpretation, i.e. the practice of bring-
ing the surface of a symptomatic formation to the deep causes of its emergence. 
If this were possible, it would be necessary to postulate a positive substantial-
ized stratum of intelligible causes that could be reconstructed through the ana-
lytic process. Unconscious would in this case be a hidden positive articulation 
of causes, images, repressed elements, etc. It would be something, and not a 
pure void, as the Cartesian/Freudian subtractive gesture suggests. Psychoanaly-
sis would be the clinical act of unveiling this hidden secret core and the end of 
analytic therapy would be the successful appropriation of something deposited 
in the profound of one’s own personality. 
11 “Witness [Freud’s] break with the most prestigious of his followers, Jung, as soon as the 
latter slipped into something whose function can only be defined as an attempt to rein-
state a subject endowed with depths (with an “s”), that is, a subject constituted by a re-
lationship—said to be archetypal—to knowledge.” (Jacques Lacan, Science and Truth, op. 
cit., p. 728.)
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We will see on the contrary that Lacan will develop a very different theory of the 
end of analysis far from any “correspondence” with an already existing hidden 
stratum of causes (knowledge) and consequential to the definition of the uncon-
scious as a subtractive void. Psychoanalysis is not about “knowing the secret of 
oneself.” But if the unconscious is void and deprived of any positive determi-
nation, what would be the Lacanian understanding of the clinical “experience 
of the unconscious”? How would it be possible to have the experience of the 
“rejection of all positive knowledge”? Lacan’s answer is that if psychoanalysis is 
not an experience of knowledge, nor a reconstruction of a hidden past, it cannot 
but be an experience of truth. In which sense?
We will address this point in the following paragraphs. For now let us recapit-
ulate once again the Cartesian-Lacanian definition of the subject as derivable 
from Science and Truth: if the hypothesis that there is a subject of science and 
that it emerged with modern science and that it is identified with a subtraction 
from every positive determination of knowledge is correct, then this subject is 
the unconscious. And conversely, in the unconscious there is thought. Psychoa-
nalysis is an experience of thought as truth, separated from the acquisition of 
positive knowledge.
As rightfully synthesized by Alain Badiou: 
What still attaches Lacan […] to the Cartesian epoch of science is the thought that 
the subject must be maintained in the pure void of its subtraction if one wishes 
to save truth. Only such a subject allows itself to be sutured within the logical, 
wholly transmissible, form of science.12
Jean-Claude Milner – letter and contingency
In order to unpack the rather elusive remarks on the ensemble of these con-
cepts (subject, science, truth, thought, and the unconscious) we will now refer 
to two historically important Lacanian contributions not directly made by La-
can on this topic. Both of them were highly influential in the way the relation 
between psychoanalysis and science has been thought and developed over the 
last thirty years within the Lacanian community. They are: Jean-Claude Miller’s 
12 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, Continuum, London – New York 2005, p. 432.
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work L’Œuvre Claire, published in 1995, wherein the Lacanian legacy of Koyré is 
analysed in all its consequences regarding the relationship between mathemat-
ics, the letter, and contingency; and Jacques-Alain Miller’s early piece La Suture: 
Éléments de la logique du signifiant, published in 1966 in the first issue of the 
Cahiers pour l’analyse, wherein the question of the relation between subject and 
science is analysed. 
Jean-Claude Milner, in a commentary on Science and Truth in chapter 2 of 
L’Œuvre Claire, derives some more consequences from the preliminary identifi-
cation of the subject of science with the subject of the unconscious. According 
to Milner, in the famous Galilean aphorism – “The great book of the universe is 
written in mathematical language and its characters are triangles, circles, and 
other geometric figures.”13 – the accent should be put on the written dimension 
of language. The discipline that constitutes a point of reference for modern sci-
ence is philology, not mathematics: 
In Galileo’s eyes, mathematics and measure were the means […] that would allow 
humble physics to one day equal what the prestigious philology, through the sci-
ence of language (via grammar), and through the science of written documents, 
had, long ago, accomplished.14
The ideal precision of modern science, for Milner, was therefore linked to the 
idea of translating the empirical object with its equivocal confusion into a literal 
and precise entity. The Cartesian subtraction is equated with a reduction to a 
pure literal expression. What is interesting here is not so much the reductive 
reading of Galilean science operated by Milner, who reduces the object of sci-
ence to the “set of what exists empirically,”15 but the way through which the 
letter is surreptitiously put at the ideal centre of a scientific endeavour. Galilean 
science becomes, for Milner, an indefatigable search for precision in order to 
elevate the empirical object to the level of the letter. Only a literal science can 
be a precise one. The technical instrumentation is aimed at extracting from the 
empirical equivocity of reality the clear precision of the letter. They are the in-
struments for reducing science to the model of philology. 
13 Il Saggiotore §6 cited in the edition of C. Chauvire, L’Essayeur de Galiée, Annales Litter. 
Franche-Comte, Paris 1980, p. 141. 
14 Jean-Claude Milner, “The Doctrine of Science,” op. cit., p. 42. 
15 Idem, p. 41. 
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But according to Milner, the discontinuity created by modern science in reduc-
ing the world to the letter requires some further clarifications. Psychoanalysis 
cannot limit itself to being dependent on the established common ground be-
tween its clinical practice and the field opened up by scientific modernity. Is 
psychoanalysis, after all, only a secondary-degree discipline, subject to the do-
main of modern science? And even more, is it possible to link psychoanalysis to 
a historical event such as the contingent emergence of modern science? 
According to Alexander Koyré, Galilean science can be understood only histori-
cally, that is, negatively when put in a relation of opposition to and difference 
with the ancient episteme of the Greeks. The latter, modelled on an understand-
ing of mathematics as a necessitated series of demonstrations, was devoted to 
isolating from the empirical world that object which, in all necessity and for 
all eternity, cannot be other than what it is. It was an epistemology according 
to which a complete science would thus be the science of the most eternal and 
necessary object, i.e. the celestial bodies. This necessitates a conflicting and 
unresolved dialectic between a mathematical demonstrative practice entirely 
devoted to logical necessity, and the realm of the empirical, which in all its di-
versity and equivocity is intrinsically rebellious to mathematics. The realm of 
Being, in the Milnerian/Koyrean understanding of the ancient Greek episteme, 
would be divided, ontologically not less than axiologically, in different degrees 
of perfection: from the contingency of bodily existents, to the Supreme incorpo-
real Being of God (necessary, perfect, eternal). 
Galilean modernity is defined by an epistemological break from such an episte-
mology. Modern science can spell out all the empirical without concerning itself 
with any hierarchy of being, and it can do so with the letter, i.e. via a calcula-
tion practice. While for the Greeks mathematics guaranteed direct access to the 
eternal, modern science makes use of a completely different mathematics which 
– as letter, insists Milner – it is able to grasp the diverse in its quality of being 
incessantly other. The empirical is not degraded as a lower form of being, but 
rather literalizable as empirical. The defining feature of Galilean science is thus 
not the fact of it being mathematical, or at least not more that it already was with 
the ancient episteme (“in certain regards, modern science is even less so”16). 
The discontinuity is represented by the emergence of a particular dimension of 
16 Idem, p. 47.
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mathematics: its being a letter. From a mathematics based on demonstration, 
modern science is defined by calculation. But what is even more important is 
that while the Greek episteme was aimed at elevating the equivocity of con-
tingent beings to the heights of celestial bodies, modern science is completely 
lacking any axiological preoccupation (“one thing […] is sure: if ethics exists, 
science has nothing to do with it”17). The letter is able to grasp the empirical as 
empirical; it looks at the contingent as contingent. 
Milner’s problem is the nature of the difference between mathematics as ne-
cessitated demonstrative practice and mathematics as a literalization of con-
tingency. As a strenuous structuralist thinker, he cannot accept that the break 
of modernity is merely a historical event. And it is at this precise point that his 
path distances itself from Koyré. According to him, Lacan in Science and Truth is 
still too indebted to a Koyrean historical concept of discontinuity, a mistake that 
will be corrected only a few years later with the theory of discourses. In order to 
purify his reflection on science and psychoanalysis, Lacan needs to develop a 
non-chronological articulation of the concept of the break.
Undoubtedly, the emergence of a new discourse, the passage from one discourse 
to another (what Lacan terms the “quarter turn”), in a word, the change, can be 
an event; these events are an object that historians attempt to grasp in the form of 
chronology. But they are not what historians say they are. […] In itself, the quarter 
turn has no need to inscribe itself in a historical series.18
Once Lacan has been able to develop a non-chronological theory of the break, it 
is possible for Milner to derive a non-chronological theory of the epistemological 
break of modernity without relying on any specific historical event. The science 
of the letter is just a figure of the possibility to grasp contingency as such. The 
problem is not the passage from the Ancient episteme to modern science, but 
how science, far from being an instrument for reducing the empirical to the same, 
is in fact an instrument for grasping what can be infinitely other than what it is. 
But what then, according to Milner, is the specific relation of the letter with 
contingency? And why would the letter be able to grasp the infinite mutability 
17 Idem, p. 49.
18 Idem, p. 51.
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of contingency? In its invariability, the letter, in fact, may look similar to the 
eternal idea of the ancient episteme. But the opposition should be searched for 
somewhere else. Milner claims that the immutability of what, like the letter, has 
no reason to be other than it is, is different from the immutability of what, like 
the celestial bodies, cannot, without violating reason, be other than it is. There 
would thus be a substantial nonconformity between the necessity of the laws of 
science and the necessity of the Supreme Being, even though at the imaginary 
level it is nowhere to be found. Is it not in fact true that the laws of nature as 
described by the empirical sciences may look like necessitated and eternal laws, 
as if they were expression of a Supreme and Eternal Being?
Science operates on an equivocity of the empirical that at any time and at any 
point can be infinitely other than it is. Nevertheless, when the letter intervenes, 
it fixes it as it is,19 and it may give the impression that the empirical cannot be 
other than what it has become. In other words, science fixes the contingency 
of the empirical in a necessitated law, even though the condition of the second 
moment relies on the infinite possibilities of the first. Paraphrasing Mallarmè’s 
Coup de dés, Milner claims that in order for a point of the universe to be mani-
fested as it is, “requires the dice to be thrown in a possible universe wherein 
this point would be other than it is.”20 There is therefore a specific intertwining 
between contingency and necessity. Necessity constitutes the operation that sci-
ence conducts on the infinite possibilities of contingency.
But here Milner suddenly clarifies his own thesis: in the interval of time when 
the dice tumble before falling there is “the emergence of the subject, which is 
not the thrower (the thrower does not exist), but the dice themselves insofar 
as they are in suspension.” At the moment when the mutually exclusive pos-
sibilities face themselves, the impossible emerges as a figure of contingency in 
the flash just after the fall of the dice when the number cannot be another one. 
The passage from contingency to necessity has a vanishing mediator, which is 
19 It is on this point that the much more convincing reflection of Quentin Meillassoux on 
the meaningless sign diverges from the relation between letter and contingency in Milner. 
For Meillassoux, the letter of formal languages (which he takes care to differentiate from 
the letter of everyday language) has the ability to grasp the hyper-chaotic contingency 
as contingency: that is, without converting it into the actualized necessity of the laws of 
natural sciences. See Quentin Meillassoux, Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative 
Analysis of the Meaningless Sign (unpublished paper).
20 Jean-Claude Milner, “The Doctrine of Science,” op. cit., p. 54.
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the tumbling of the dice, i.e. the subject. When the letter fixes contingency in a 
necessity, it imposes the erasure of these infinite possibilities, marking them as 
impossible. Necessity takes the place of contingency as much as impossibility 
takes the place of infinite possibilities. Science fixes this point and it forbids 
the return to the contingent. Psychoanalysis and science here deviate from each 
other: according to Milner, the former constitutes the persistent contestation of 
contingency against its own erasure by the laws of the latter. The letter is fixed, 
but at the same time it refuses to be subjugated to the regime of the Same as in 
the ancient episteme. The famous Freudian statement according to which the 
unconscious does not recognize that time should be understood in these terms: 
the unconscious does not recognize the conversion of contingency into neces-
sity as operated by the fixing of the letter by science. 
Jacques-Alain Miller addressed the same point regarding the well-known para-
dox of contingent futures.21 Sophism explains the conversion of contingency into 
necessity as follows: from the point of view of today, an event may or may not 
take place tomorrow (possibility). Tomorrow, in the eventuality that it does take 
place, it will always have been true that it took place. And it will be necessary 
that it has always been true that it took place (impossible that it did not). Miller 
underlines how the conversion of the possible into the necessary is an effect 
of retroaction, and psychoanalysis is concerned precisely with this backward 
temporality of past signification. In the temporality of the unconscious, contin-
gency does not cease to haunt its conversion into necessity. According to Miller, 
the linear time of science is the time of the transformation of possibility into ac-
tuality, but there is also the retroactive temporality where the impossible (what 
has not taken place) refuses to be completely excluded (“foreclosed,” Lacan 
would have said) and is still effectively operative as impossible. Psychoanalysis 
constitutes the objection against the exclusion of the impossible from the realm 
of the necessary. Or in other words, the subject of psychoanalysis constitutes the 
exception of the linear progression of the temporality of science. 
The erasure of this retroactive temporality of the contingent subject of the un-
conscious from the fixed letter of science has some specific consequences in the 
relation between psychoanalysis and science. While Lacan claims that science 
21 Jacques-Alain Miller, “Introduction to the Erotics of Time,” in Lacanian Ink 24/25, Winter/
Spring 2005, pp. 18-19.
FV_02_2013.indd   189 15. 12. 13   18:39
190
pietro bianchi
was responsible for opening up the field for the emergence of the subject, it 
seems that it also closes it down with the prescription of the inopportunity to 
return to the contingent. Science and Truth bears the trace of this double move-
ment that also exposes the uncertainty and hesitation in Lacanian thinking of 
the doctrine of science. Later in the text, Lacan reiterates the conviction that 
something in the status of the object of science “remained unelucidated since 
the birth of science.”22 This object is none other than the pivotal element around 
which the theory and practice of psychoanalysis revolves: the notion of objet 
petit a, i.e. the causal dimension of truth. Lacan is not afraid to define it “the 
breaking point”23 where the path of science and psychoanalysis diverge (“the 
truth as cause being distinguished from knowledge put into operation”24). Sci-
ence allows the delineation of the crack between knowledge and truth, but at 
the same time it keeps it veiled and it persists in the illusion of joining them 
together. Science should thus be blamed primarily for forgetting: forgetting the 
trace of the infinite contingency that the letter fixes, but also for forgetting the 
dimension of truth that psychoanalysis applied in its practice. “The radicality 
of this forgetting – Milner claims – is what Lacan called foreclosure.”25 But since 
the subject is what emerges in the tumbling of the dice at the instant when con-
tingency is about to morph into necessity, and since the subject-as-lack is what 
is at the core of truth as a cause in scientific endeavour, “suture and foreclosure 
are necessarily the suture and foreclosure of the subject.”26
Jacques-Alain Miller and Suture
The Lacanian argument according to which scientific rationality structurally in-
volves a misrecognition/erasure of the function of the subject – i.e. a foreclosure – 
can be found, skilfully argued, in an early text by Jacques-Alain Miller from the 
mid-1960s. First presented as a paper at the 9th session (24 February 1965) of La-
can’s Seminar XII (Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis), La Suture: Éléments de 
la logique du signifiant, “the first great Lacanian text not to be written by Lacan 
himself,”27 constitutes the perfect completion of Science and Truth in addressing 
22 Jacques Lacan, Science and Truth, op. cit., p. 733.
23 Idem, p. 737.
24 Idem, p. 738.
25 Jean-Claude Milner, “The Doctrine of Science,” op. cit., p. 54.
26 Ibidem.
27 Alain Badiou, Number and Numbers, Polity, Cambridge 2008, p. 25. 
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the complex relationship between Lacanianism and science. The term suture, 
investigated by Miller in the text, was mentioned by Lacan several times during 
Seminar XI in 1964, but never thoroughly theorized. It was therefore Miller’s 
task in this article, also included in the first issue of the Cahiers pour l’analyse, 
to rigorously define the concept. 
With the term suture Miller understands “the relation of the subject to the chain 
of its discourse.”28 With this text he wants to conceptually ground the act of 
cancellation that the discourse of science operates on the subject of the un-
conscious and at the same time to generalize this very procedure in the way 
any subject relates to the signifier chain. As in the erasure of contingency in its 
conversion into necessity, the punctum of the enunciation of the subject (the 
“trembling of the dice”) is at the same time the fundamental operational gesture 
for setting the machine of science into motion and that element the forgetting 
of which is inevitable once the discourse of science is established. Why is there 
this apparent contradiction for an element that is at the same time necessary 
and rejected? Because the cancellation act is never entirely successful, and it 
cannot be: some remainders, some symptoms, some stains, will always hijack 
the discourse of science, exposing its proclaimed universality to the contesta-
tion of the formations of the unconscious. The subject of the unconscious is thus 
always operative; the discourse of science, though, refuses to recognize its truth 
and therefore rejects it while not wanting to know anything about it. 
In order to prove his argument, as an object of analysis Miller takes the scien-
tific discourse of Gottlob Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic. His thesis is that in 
Frege’s theory of the constitution of the series of natural numbers “in the gen-
esis of progression, the function of the subject, miscognized, is operative.”29 Let 
us see what Miller’s argument is regarding this specific scientific discourse. 
Frege’s logicist system tries to found the sequence of natural numbers: faithful 
to his anti-empiricism, he deals only with concepts deprived of any external ref-
erent. It is an autonomous construction of logic through itself. He therefore can-
not not rely on a primacy of a thing that then has to be subsumed by a concept 
(i.e. like counting an external already existing object). The first problem is that 
28 Jacques-Alain Miller, “La Suture: Éléments de la logique du signifiant,” in Cahiers pour 
l’analyse, no. 1, 1966, p. 39.
29 Idem, p. 40.
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even before a concept can subsume an object, it has to be explained how the 
object is transformed into a unit. In order to become numerable, the object as 
an empirical referent has to disappear. Frege defines the unit with a redoubled 
concept of identity (“the number assigned to the concept F is the extension of 
the concept ‘identical to the concept F’”) by borrowing Leibniz’s definition of 
identity: eadem sunt quorum unum potest substitui alteri salva veritate (those 
things are identical of which one can be substituted for the other without loss 
of truth). Leibniz’s salva veritate thus rests on the concept of self-identity: truth 
can be said only of things that are identical to themselves, and conversely, the 
confirmation of self-identity preserves truth. 
According to Miller, Frege’s system relies on a performative contradiction. On 
one hand, if a thing is not identical to itself, the whole logical edifice collapses 
(truth is not saved), on the other hand, non-self identity has to be evoked, even 
for an instant, in order to found the redoubling of self-identity. Truth is thus 
founded on a simultaneous invocation-and-exclusion of the non self-identical. 
In other words, if we supposed that an object were not self-identical, it would 
entirely subvert truth given that the principle ‘A is A’ is the law of any possi-
ble truth. No object should thus fall under the concept “not identical to itself,” 
which is therefore void. In order for this very principle of not-self-identity to be 
rejected, it must first have previously been posed. Miller’s fundamental argu-
ment, which will constitute a fundamental building block for the Lacanian logic 
of the signifier chain, regards the foundation of the logical edifice thusly: 
in the autonomous construction of the logical through itself, it has been neces-
sary, in order to exclude any reference to the real, to evoke on the level of the 
concept an object not-identical-with itself, to be subsequently rejected from the 
dimension of truth.30
Miller wants to keep the anti-empiricist stance of Frege’s logicist system with its 
refusal to presuppose any extra-logical real, while at the same time highlighting 
the point of internal exclusion that founds this very system (following the model 
of the Möbius strip). Zero is the number that will be at the same time present 
and absent. Or better stated, it will be counted as absence (“the first non-real 
30 Idem, p. 45. 
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thing in thought”31). Referring to a category with no members, zero is by defini-
tion void; nevertheless it is a category, and in being such it can effectively be 
counted. With such an operation the number 1 is produced, and through the 
repetition of the same procedure, also all the other natural numbers. In this 
movement, the mark of the non-self-identical forms the foundation of the signi-
fying chain of numbers. 
Miller concludes by establishing a logical priority of 0 over 1. Self-identity has 
as its origin a mark of non-self-identity. But in order for self-identity to emerge, 
while preserving the consistency of truth, it is necessary for the non-self-identi-
ty to not only be elided, but actually repressed. Miller here applies a short circuit 
between the active causality of the non-self-identity in founding the sequence, 
and its disappearance in the progression of the natural numbers/signifying 
chain. The truth caused by the action of a lack (truth-as-lack) is reversed in a re-
jection of the dimension of truth from the scientific discourse (the lack-of-truth). 
The subject of the unconscious is that non-self-identical lack, which the dis-
course of science summons and rejects, wanting to know nothing of it:
To designate [this operation] I choose the name suture. Suture names the relation 
of the subject to the chain of its discourse; we shall see that it figures there as the 
element which is lacking, in the form of a stand-in [tenant-lieu]. For, while there 
lacking, it is not purely and simply absent. Suture, by extension – the general 
relation of lack to the structure – of which it is an element, inasmuch as it implies 
the position of a taking-the-place-of [tenant-lieu].32
In delineating the concept of suture Miller establishes what will become a Laca-
nian canon: from now on, the relation that the subject-as-lack entertains with 
the signifier chain (and if we follow the definition of science as a reduction of the 
Real to the realm of the signifier, also with the discourse of science in general) 
will be understood as follows. The subject-as-lack is the hidden and repressed 
causality of the signifier chain that is nevertheless always operative in the dia-
lectic of substitution and permutations of the elements. The never ending slip-
ping of the chain is none other than the causality miscognized but nevertheless 
not-absent of the lack. The subject may thus seem absent: the chain of scientific 
31 Idem, p. 44.
32 Idem, p. 40.
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signifiers seems to be perfectly self-sufficient. But it is all an ideological mystifi-
cation. In fact, if we look closely – the Lacanian would say – we are able to see 
that the subject is far from being absent: it is just stitched in the very progres-
sion of the chain with the always different stand-in (lieu-tenant) that presentifies 
its presence-as-absence (its being-counted-as-absence). The subject is therefore 
neither present nor absent: it rather constitutes the truth of the signifier chain. 
It is sutured at the chain. 
This triplet of terms – lack, subject, and truth – constitutes a dimension of incom-
patibility with the discourse of science. Lacan concludes Science and Truth with 
an unambiguous claim regarding science’s rejection of the dimension of truth: 
[O]ur science’s prodigious fecundity must be examined in relation to the fact, sus-
taining science, that science does-not-want-to-know-anything about the truth as 
cause. You may recognize therein my formulation of Verwerfung or “foreclosure,” 
which forms a closed series here with Verdrängung, “repression,” and Verneinung, 
“negation,” whose function in magic and religion I have indicated in passing.33
As Lacan says earlier in the text: the “point [of truth] is veiled in science.”34 Such 
a rejection of truth must place science in the field of an imaginary ideology, 
structurally ignorant of the causal dimension of lack. The transmission of its 
knowledge is reduced to the level of communication. In this field where contin-
gency is forgotten, where there is a blind miscognition of the presence/absence 
of the subject, where the Real is arrogantly proclaimed to be reduced to a per-
fectly transmissible sequence of signifiers, psychoanalysis cannot but play the 
role of analysis of the symptoms of science with a very unappealing conceptual 
consequence. Science in the arguments of Milner, Miller, and Lacan’s Science 
and Truth is a field that is not able to recognize where its foundation actually 
lies: that is, in the causal dimension of truth-as-lack (or as subject). The scien-
tific discourse cannot be self-sufficient if not as an ideology, because its founda-
tion lies in what it is rejected from its field. Miller’s analysis of Frege is in this 
regard a straightforward argument in favour of a foundational theory of science 
by the subject of the unconscious: the 0 – the non-self-identity, i.e. the subject – 
is primary and foundational regarding the 1 of self-identity. Following this line of 
33 Jacques Lacan, Science and Truth, op. cit., p. 742.
34 Idem, p. 738.
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thought, psychoanalysis ends up placing itself in a position of mastery toward 
science: no matter what its concepts or propositions are, science will never be 
able to generate truths. Truth and science are on two separate planes that never 
cross each other: they rather lie intertwined in a Möbius strip, as Lacan loves to 
say. The problem is that the three-dimensional point of view able to theorize on 
the relation between science and truth is firmly occupied by psychoanalysis as 
a theory: in this case, weirdly close to what Lacan always forbade it from being. 
A metalanguage. 
The axiomatization of psychoanalysis
If we follow the elaboration of the previously discussed Lacanians regarding 
the relationship between psychoanalysis and science, it seems that we have ar-
rived at a cul-de-sac. In what risks being a portrait painted with excessively dark 
tones, there might be an alternative route, which while not resolving the issue 
might at least help reformulate the problem in a more productive way. While 
the concept of suture risks reducing the field of scientific practice to a mere im-
aginary foreclosure of the causal dimension of truth, what might assist in a re-
consideration of the problem is none other than the minimal definition of the 
subject of modern science developed by Descartes and re-proposed by Lacan in 
the first half of Science and Truth. 
It is not difficult in fact to note a shift from the subtractive gesture of the Car-
tesian cogito to the theory of the productivity of the lack in the causality of the 
structure. While the former movement is characterized by a rejection of any 
positive knowledge in order to isolate a void, in the latter we have a lack that lies 
at the base of the productive machine of positive knowledge. While the Carte-
sian subject is a nothing that has to be produced through the practice of the de-
imaginarization (or de-ideologization) of a positivity (in Althusserian terms, an 
epistemological break), the action of the lack is an underlying, yet apparently 
rejected, hidden cause that founds, through a short-circuit between a level and 
a meta-level, positive – and by definition ideological – knowledge. The problem 
of the relation between psychoanalysis and science cannot evade the question 
of whether the object of a scientific endeavour is the positive construction of 
knowledge, as is ideologically claimed by Miller and Milner, or rather the pro-
ductive isolation of a thought through a procedure of subtractive formalization. 
The consequences of such a problem are pivotal for a theory of the subject of 
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science, deprived of the confusion that the term “subject” and “science” might 
engender when not carefully defined, as is in the case of the Millerian theory of 
suture. The difference between the two definitions of science is that in the first 
case the subject is a logical presupposition that lies at the core of all already 
existing knowledge: it is the truth-as-a-foundation that provides the conditions 
of possibility of every proposition and every object. In the second case, which 
can be called Cartesian, the subject is a hypothesis, or even better a task that 
has to be effectively rendered operative through a series of operations of de-
imaginarization and de-ideologization. 
Alain Badiou, in Marque et manque: à propos du zéro, an article from 1969 from 
the last issue of Cahiers pour l’analyse, gives a compelling and convincing cri-
tique of the Millerian understanding of the concept of suture in not dissimilar 
terms. According to Badiou, the relation that a subject entertains with the chain 
of its discourse can be called suture only when these discourses are not genu-
inely scientific. In a dialectic between ideological closure – when the subject ap-
pears as a cause of the scientific chain in the typical Lacanian short-circuit be-
tween level and meta-level – and a scientific rupture which operates a constant 
de-suturing,35 Badiou coherently defines an ideal universal science as an autono-
mous machine completely deprived of any cause, and therefore of any subject: 
There is no subject of science. Infinitely stratified, regulating its passages, science 
is pure space, with neither reverse nor mark nor place for what it excludes. A 
foreclosure, but one of nothing, may be called a psychosis of no subject – and 
therefore of all: universal by full right, a shared delirium, it is enough to hold 
oneself within it to no longer be anyone, anonymously dispersed in the hierarchy 
of orders. Science is an Outside without a blind spot.36
Here Badiou understand the term subject in the ideological (or Millerian) sense: 
as the alleged structural lack of the scientific discourse that ends up constituting 
the foundational cause of it. Science, on the contrary, is the progressive opera-
tion of de-ideologization and de-imaginarization that excludes the ideological 
operator of subject from its field until the regulative-ideal point of an “infinite 
35 Zachary Luke Fraser, Introduction to Alain Badiou, The Concept of Model. An Introduction 
to the Materialist Epistemology of Mathematics, re.press, Melbourne 2007, pp. xiii – lxv. 
36 Alain Badiou, “Marque et manque: à propos du zéro,” in Cahiers pour l’analysie, no. 10, 
1969, pp. 161-162.
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stratification,” a “pure space,” or a “psychosis”: a point where science would 
be completely free from any ideological recuperation (a “machinic universal-
ism,” as Zachary Luke Fraser defines it37). But if we understand the term subject 
not in the imaginary or ideological sense, but in the subtractive and Cartesian 
sense, we see that this very act of an epistemological break is none other than 
the process of the reduction of the positivity of ideological knowledge to the 
productivity of the pure void. In other words, it is the process of questioning the 
positivity of the Imaginary in order for the subtraction of the pure thought-as-
void to emerge. Psychoanalysis has too often been crudely reduced to the prac-
tice of hermeneutical analysis of an already-existing subject of the unconscious 
(“it is down there, we just have to dig into the psyche in order to take it out”) as 
if it were a homunculus placed inside of a human being. But the subject of the 
unconscious, if we follow the subtractive, non-substantial, and Cartesian defi-
nition given by Lacan, is not something that is already there from the outset; it 
rather has to be produced during the experience of analysis. At the beginning of 
an analysis it is necessarily a hypothesis. In this sense, psychoanalysis could be 
coherently defined as a machine in order for the pure void of the unconscious – 
the subtraction from any ideological positivity of knowledge – to emerge: at the 
end, not at the beginning. It is a technique for helping the rigorous counterin-
tuitive de-suturing operation of the scientific machine. Psychoanalysis is not a 
technique for giving a series of enigmatic signifiers a positive signification, but 
it is rather a way to get rid of any pretension of signification: to isolate the pure 
subtractive gesture of the resistance to positive signification. 
The problem of the subjective experience of psychoanalysis is rather that the 
tendency to reduce the pure nothingness of the surface to the deepness of mean-
ing is extremely strong; and it is precisely what concerns the intricacies of the 
register of the Imaginary. A formation of the unconscious can only be partially 
reduced to a certain interpretation during psychoanalysis. An analytic interpre-
tation is by definition always insufficient (and this is the reason why Lacanian 
analysts have the tendency to remain silent and to avoid giving a meaning to 
a symptom), but the sequence and the multiplicity of wrong interpretations 
session after session expose in a progressively clear way the fact that there is 
something that cannot be reduced to interpretation: something which remains 
37 Zachary Luke Fraser, Introduction to Alain Badiou, The Concept of Model. An Introduction 
to the Materialist Epistemology of Mathematics, op. cit., p. xlix.
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stubbornly on the surface. What happens when, after many years of analysis, 
an analysand starts to be able to circumscribe the kernel of the symptom that is 
reluctant to be reduced to a meaning is none other than the tiring acceptance of 
a nothingness; or in better terms, the personal construction of this nothingness. 
Many Lacanians define the circumscription of the un-analysable kernel of an 
analysis sinthome, borrowing a term used by Lacan in his seminars of the late 
Seventies. But this term, which had a certain function within the progression 
of Lacan’s teaching, has been almost unanimously taken as an ultimate (and 
singular) proof of a re-substantialization of this void in what became a bizarre 
version of a materialism of jouissance.  
The contribution that science can make to psychoanalysis is precisely the rig-
orous conceptualization of this gesture of subtraction from knowledge. Sci-
ence, and in particular mathematics, is in fact able to provide transmissible 
constructability to this nothing. While psychoanalysis (in this sense, closer to 
politics than science) is able to de-ideologize and de-imaginarize the stubborn 
tendency of the individual to rely on a sequence of positive signification and 
to isolate the kernel of ultimate resistance to meaning, science is actually able 
to construct a sequence of thoughts and concepts on this nothing. Mathemat-
ics is the proof that the nothing that we isolate at the end of an analysis is not 
the ultimate word of psychoanalysis: this is the reason why until the end of his 
life Lacan never gave up on the question of the transmissibility of the uncon-
scious. That gesture of subtraction cannot end with an individual (or subjective, 
there is no difference at this level) conglomerate of bodily jouissance, defined 
as sinthome. This cynical outcome – which unfortunately became dominant in 
a Lacanian community progressively hegemonized by the primacy of a clinic 
which increasingly resembles the primacy of the “cure” – cannot contemplate 
the fact that upon this very nothingness something can still be done and still be 
constructed. Science maintains the promise of a possible collective outcome for 
the – otherwise unjustly accused – individuality of the experience of analysis. 
The void at the end of analysis is not a therapeutic goal, but rather a starting 
point for constructing an edifice of concepts. Psychoanalysis is, in a word, a 
propaedeutic for a de-ideologized science. 
The concept of axiom can be an appropriate way to explain how concretely a 
re-framing of the question of the relationship between psychoanalysis and sci-
ence, thought and knowledge, subject and ideology, subtraction and positivity 
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can look. The axiom indicates a procedure according to which a spontaneous 
(i.e. ideological) definition of a certain object is progressively deprived of any in-
tuitive presuppositions and reduced to a minimal group of properties which are 
the ones given by the chosen system (and not more). Contrary to the Euclidean 
model of axiomatization, which started from the self-evidence of a certain en-
semble of concepts (e.g. line, point, etc.), the formal axiomatic does not rely on 
any spontaneous or ideological presupposed definition. It actually produces its 
own elements and concepts by itself. Here we can see how the Badiousian strati-
fication of a scientific machine with no outside, as was addressed in Marque 
et manqué, might look. But how it is possible to clean the spontaneous under-
standing of certain concepts in order to arrive at a formal axiomatization? Gabri-
ele Lolli explains it in this way:
At first, you take some rough analogies from already known domains, like phys-
ics: for example, in order to refer to the topological notions invented by Cantor, 
what might the word “dense” suggest when referring to the distribution of the 
points of a set? Does it mean that the points “touch” themselves? But the points 
cannot touch themselves even if they are very close. We can say that there are 
many of them in a small space, but in fact we should say that there are infinite 
points. And that is not even enough. If we take an example from everyday life 
and from the distribution of populations: to explain the density we can think of 
the inhabitants of a neighbourhood, but that is not enough; we can think of the 
roommates of an apartment, but that is not enough; we can think that in every 
room there is at least one person, but that is not enough; we can think that in 
every square meter there is at least one person, until the area tends to zero. After 
a certain point we have to abandon the analogy with real populations. Infinity 
imposes conditions that go beyond any confrontation with the finite world.38 
Little by little, when the conditions start to become more and more precise 
through a formal sequence of operations, they become sufficient to make the 
properties explicit. When we reach this point, the spontaneous ideological 
definitions of the elements are no longer taken into consideration. A notion is 
formed from and depends only on the explicit characteristics and not the ones 
that are alluded to or not mentioned. The same thing happens with the defi-
nition of the concept set in set theory: maybe at first we have to define it as 
38 Gabriele Lolli, Dagli insiemi ai numeri, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino 1994, p. 23.
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a collection of different elements, but then it becomes clear that the elements 
belonging to a set are a set themselves, and the primary definition of what a set 
is must be abandoned. What a set is – at that point – will no longer be a primary 
definition, but an internal production of the axiomatic system itself. As if the set 
were a creation of the axiomatic system.
This procedure, according to which a formal element is first considered in its 
analogical relation with something external to itself and little by little this defi-
nition is abandoned when the properties of the system become clear, is none 
other than the procedure of de-ideologization and de-imaginarization. The rela-
tion between psychoanalysis and science relies precisely on this common oper-
ational status: in order to arrive at a pure mathematical machine we have to get 
rid of any presumption of signification and relation to an external referent (we 
have to subtract from any empirical referent). But while psychoanalysis arrives 
at the point where the subtractive production of a nothingness is guaranteed 
with a technical procedure of de-imaginarization, mathematics is actually able 
to make something out of this nothingness: the creative invention of concepts 
and thoughts. One of the characteristics of modern mathematics is that math-
ematical entities are introduced by creative definitions that are not linked to 
any external or empirical given. But in order to reach this domain of subtraction 
from the empirical realm, we have to undergo a procedure of elimination of the 
pretension of the Imaginary to reduce the surface to meaning and signification. 
As Alain Badiou once said at a conference39: “the problem of mathematics is not 
that is too difficult, but rather that is too simple. It is only letters. It is too much 
on the surface.” The problem is rather: how to inhabit this surface? How to elim-
inate the ideological profundity of the Self in order to isolate that void that can 
help us to creatively inhabit the domain of thought? Psychoanalysis is a histori-
cal model (certainly open to ameliorations and emendations) for concretely pos-
ing this question. Or better stated, psychoanalysis is the political way to produce 
the subject of the unconscious that is the same as the subject of science. 
39 Alain Badiou, Lacan & Philosophy, University of California – Los Angeles, 27 May 2010 (ac-
cessible online at: http://ect.humnet.ucla.edu/video).
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